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THE WHEELCHAIR RAMP TO SERFDOM:
THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT,
LIBERTY, AND MARKETS
MARK A. SCHUMAN*
The great economist Friedrich von Hayek once pointed out that
liberty is seldom lost all at once, but rather is lost a little bit at a
time.1 Another economist, Walter Williams, made the same point
in a bit more folksy manner when he compared the process by
which government has deprived the American people of their lib-
erty to the method of cooking a frog. If one drops a frog into boil-
ing water, the frog will jump out of the pot. If, however, one puts
the frog in tepid water and raises the temperature a little bit at a
time, the frog will not realize the danger until too late, and will
remain in the pot long enough to be cooked. Similarly, the Ameri-
can people have objected to sudden, massive attempts to restrict
their freedom. Yet government has deprived the American people
of significant parts of their liberty in a slow, incremental fashion,
and the American people have, for the most part, reacted
passively.
The Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA")2 is such an incre-
mental deprivation of freedom. While all laws prohibiting dis-
crimination in private employment are deprivations of liberty to
some extent, 3 the ADA is a significant step beyond such laws as
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 ("Title VII")4 and the Age
* J.D., Yale Law School, 1991; B.A., Harpur College, Binghamton University, 1988. The
speaker/author is a former Law Clerk to the Honorable Samuel Alito, Jr. of the United
States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit and is an associate of McCarter & English in
Newark, New Jersey. The views expressed in this speech are solely those of the author. ©
1995, Mark A. Schuman.
1 See generally FRIEDRICH A. VON HAYEK, THm RoAD To SERFDOM (1944) (quoting David
Hume).
2 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq. (Supp. V 1993).
3 See, e.g., RicHARm EPsTEIN, FORBIDDEN GRouNDs (1992). With regard to government
actions in derogation of liberty of contract more generally, see RicHARD EpsTEIN, TAKINGS
(1985).
4 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981a, 2000e et seq. (Supp. IV 1993) as amended by the "Civil Rights Act"
of 1991.
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Discrimination in Employment Act ("ADEA").5 I want to focus on
two ways that the ADA restricts freedom in new dimensions, in-
crementally depriving the American people of a bit more of their
liberty. First, by attempting to eliminate discrimination based on
disability, the ADA denies an employer the right to determine the
qualifications and abilities relevant to a job. Second, by imposing
a duty to reasonably accommodate an employee's or applicant's
disability, the ADA establishes a fallaciously "just" or "equitable"
price in the terms and conditions of the job, with all the displace-
ment and deprivation of opportunity which such price-fixing inevi-
tably produces.
Anti-discrimination statutes, including the ADA, single out par-
ticular characteristics and forbid an employer to discriminate
against an individual "because of" the possession of a protected
characteristic in regard to hiring, firing, promotion, compensation,
or other terms and conditions of employment.6 Employees charg-
ing illegal discrimination must prove not merely that the em-
ployer took an adverse employment action against the employee,
but also that the employer took the action for a particular prohib-
ited reason.
Earlier anti-discrimination statutes, such as Title VII, were
originally intended to restrict freedom in a relatively small way
and otherwise to leave employers and employees free to order
their affairs as they saw fit. Congress expressed its intent, in stat-
utory language, legislative history, and debate, that Title VII was
aimed at intentional discrimination and that its incursion on free-
dom would be small.7 Indeed, on their faces, both the ADA and
earlier anti-discrimination statutes leave an employer free to take
whatever employment action it wants so long as it does not do so
5 29 U.S.C. § 621 et seq. (1994).
6 See 42 U.S.C. §§ 12112(a), 2000e-2(aX1) (Supp. V 1993); 29 U.S.C. § 623(a) (1994)
(prohibiting employment actions "because of" protected characteristics).
7 See, e.g., United Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 231-52 (1979) (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting) (noting legislative history and debate to effect that Congress did not intend to
require discrimination in favor of employee or applicant on the basis of race or other pro-
tected characteristic, to require hiring based on protected characteristics in order to rectify
"imbalance" in work force, or to restrict employer freedom other than to force employers to
disregard protected characteristics). In particular, Senator Hubert Humphrey stressed
that Title VII would not" 'limit the employer's freedom to hire, fire, promote, or demote for
any reasons-or no reasons-so long as his action is not based on race ... .'" Weber, 443
U.S. at 236-37 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); see also Ronald Turner, Thirty Years of Title
VII's Regulatory Regime: Rights, Theories and Realities, 46 ALA. L. REv. 375, 428 (1995)
(noting Title VII was initially aimed at preventing intentional discrimination).
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for a forbidden reason. These statutes do not protect anyone, in-
cluding a person with a disability, from an adverse employment
action; rather, they require only equal treatment in disregard of
the relevant characteristic.8
Intent to discriminate, however, is hidden. It exists only in the
mind of the actor. Even if an employer intended to act on a pro-
hibited basis, it would not express that intent because of the pro-
hibition. More importantly, employers' freedom in offering the
terms of the employment relationship effectively allows them to
make employment decisions on whatever bases they choose, in
spite of anti-discrimination laws, so long as they do not express an
illegal reason.9 No restriction limited simply to overtly intentional
discrimination, as Title VII's original supporters described it to be,
could be remotely effective in "eliminating" discrimination. Thus,
under the guise of realizing the goals of anti-discrimination laws,
government has seized power to restrict freedom more greatly
than originally intended or envisioned in purported pursuit of
more effectively discerning employers' true intentions. One of the
most notable ways in which this occurred was when courts began
to allow employees to prove intentional discrimination by the "in-
direct" method of the prima facie case and proof of pretext for dis-
crimination, first authoritatively described in McDonnell Douglas
8 See Anderson v. University of Wisc., 841 F.2d 737, 741-42 (7th Cir. 1988); Pollard v.
Rea Magnet Wire Co., 824 F.2d 557 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 977 (1987).
9 For example, if an employer remains free to determine the skills and qualifications for
a job, its criteria may effectively, by design or not, exclude those who share some particular
characteristic on the basis of which intentional discrimination may be prohibited. Criteria
which are difficult to measure objectively, such as teamwork, supervisory skill, or quality of
performance, present further opportunities for the employer to make relatively free choices
without expressly (or even intentionally) discriminating against persons sharing certain
characteristics. See, e.g., Ezold v. Wolf, Block, Shorr & Solis-Cohen, 983 F.2d 509, 542-45
(3d Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 88 (1993) (noting that criteria for law firm partner-
ship are particularly good examples of criteria of employer's judgment of which court
should avoid second guessing).
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Corp. v. Green.1 ° The indirect method of proof is available under
the ADA."
Eventually, however, even the requirement to prove intent to
discriminate was eliminated. "Disparate impact" analysis, first
authoritatively recognized by the Supreme Court in Griggs v.
Duke Power Co. ,12 focuses on the racial, sexual, or ethnic composi-
tion of the employer's work force in comparison with an "expected"
composition, as prima facie evidence of discrimination. 13 This
came to be contrasted with "disparate treatment" analysis, as the
traditional inquiry into illegally discriminatory intent came to be
known.
We should not be surprised that a regime intended to control
the labor market, or indeed any market, in only one small way
resulted in massive government scrutiny and intrusion. Govern-
10 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973). An employee alleging intentional discrimination, or "dispa-
rate treatment," may prove a prima facie case by proving possession of the relevant charac-
teristic, sufficient qualifications for job in question, sufferance of an adverse employment
action (rejection for the job, termination from employment, etc.), and replacement by or
more favorable treatment of one not sharing the relevant characteristic. Id. If the employee
proves a prima facie case of discrimination, the employer must come forward with a legally
permissible reason for its action. Id.; see also St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 113 S. Ct.
2742, 2747 (1993); Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 250 (1981).
If the employee can show sufficient inplausibilities, inconsistencies, or other indicia of
doubt that this was the employer's true motivation, the employee may ask the fact finder to
conclude that the illegal basis was the true motivation based on the evidence of her prima
facie case and the doubt regarding the employer's stated reason, all without any direct
evidence of discriminatory intent. St. Mary's, 113 S. Ct. at 2749; Fuentes v. Perskie, 32
F.3d 759, 765 (3d Cir. 1994) (stating that if employee can show that employer's proffered
reason is so weak, implausible, inconsistent, incoherent, or contradictory so as to be unwor-
thy of credence, employee may ask fact finder to infer that proffered reason was pretext for
discrimination); Ezold v. Wolf, Block, Schorr & Solis-Cohen, 983 F.2d 509, 527 (3d Cir.
1992), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 88 (1993) (same); Josey v. John R. Hollingworth Corp., 996
F.2d 632, 638 (3d Cir. 1993) (same).
Regarding the significance of the indirect method of proof on liberty, see generally Mark
A. Schuman, The Politics of Presumption: St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks and the Burdens
of Proof in Employment Discrimination Cases, 9 ST. JOHN'S J. LEGAL COMMENT. 67, 84-94
(1993).
11 See, e.g., Daigle v. Liberty Life Ins. Co., 70 F.3d 394, 396 (5th Cir. 1995); Price v. S-B
Power Tool, 75 F.3d 312, 364-65 (8th Cir. 1996).
12 401 U.S. 424, 432 (1971).
13 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k) (Supp. V 1993); Griggs, 401 U.S. at 432 (recognizing dispa-
rate impact analysis). Under the disparate impact theory, the employee may prevail
against an employer for discrimination despite the neutrality of its practices on their face.
Without any proof of intent to discriminate on an illegal basis against it, the employer is
nonetheless liable if an employment practice tends to preclude or eliminate those sharing a
characteristic to a greater extent than it excludes those not sharing that characteristic. The
employer's defense, once this disparate impact is shown, is the thin reed of justification of
the practice as job related and justified by business necessity. In order to prevail, the em-
ployer must also survive the employee's rebuttal that a less exclusionary practice would
serve the employer's purposes as well as the challenged criterion or practice.
For one criticism of the idea underlying disparate impact analysis, the "residual fallacy,"
see THOMAS SOWELL, THE VISION OF THE ANOINTED 31-63 (1995).
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ment control inevitably grows wherever government itself is given
discretion over where, when, and on what grounds it is to exercise
its power. When government starts out with only limited control
of free decision-making, individuals will inevitably find ways to
circumvent the plans and assert their free choice through their
remaining freedom. This is especially true when government tries
to control voluntary transactions in which both parties to the bar-
gain stand to benefit, such as employment relationships. Inevita-
bly, government finds its will thwarted, and increases the scope of
its regulation and control in an effort to eliminate what it per-
ceives as "loopholes." Government finds it must monitor, scruti-
nize, and control more and more previously free decisions. As the
zone of freedom diminishes, individuals continue to shift their be-
havior to avoid the controls, and government continues to react by
further encroaching on freedom in an effort to close the loopholes
and ferret out discrimination. In this way, the logic of the original
prohibition on free decision making produces more and more gov-
ernment control.
The ADA is intended to preclude employment decisions based
on assertedly "irrelevant" disabilities. 14 Since qualifications for a
job are themselves set in terms of abilities, however, a condition
that substantially limits a major life activity may easily impair
the ability to do a job. Substantial limitation of a major life activ-
ity is the very definition of a disability under the ADA. 15 Unlike
one's race, sex, ethnicity, or age, the nature of one's abilities and
disabilities always strikes to the heart of whether one can do the
job in question. Hence, any regime to forbid discrimination based
on disability inevitably becomes a regime to control the duties and
performances an employer may require for a job. The ADA has
produced just such controls, which go far beyond what was origi-
nally envisioned under earlier anti-discrimination laws.
14 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(9) (Supp. V 1993). The findings of Congress in passing the ADA
decry "the continuing existence of unfair and unnecessary discrimination and prejudice...
[which] costs the United States billions of dollars in unnecessary expenses resulting from
dependency and nonproductivity." Id. Congress purported to exercise both its power to reg-
ulation interstate commerce and its power to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment in enact-
ing the ADA. Id. § 12101(b)(4).
15 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A) (1988 & Supp. V 1993); 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(g) (1995) (Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") regulations under the ADA are codified at
part 1630 of volume 29 of the Code of Federal Regulations); see also Oswalt v. Sara Lee
Corp., 71 F.3d 91, 92 (5th Cir. 1996) (holding that condition substantially affects one or
more major life activity required to prove disability).
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Under the ADA, courts and agencies must determine the "essen-
tial functions" of a job in order to determine whether an individual
can perform those functions. 16 This involves separating "funda-
mental job duties" of the position from "marginal functions.""7 The
employer may then consider only the ability to perform essential
job functions in determining qualification for a job.' 8 Conse-
quently, government scrutiny of job duties must be pervasive in
order to prevent employers from consideration of assertedly irrele-
vant disabilities.
As a result, the ADA, even more than other anti-discrimination
statutes, encourages the kind of bureaucratization of employers'
organizations and standardization of management structures that
frustrates innovation and opportunity for both employers and em-
ployees, including the disabled. The ADA and its regulations and
administrative procedures assume that employers have hierarchi-
cal, standardized organizations in which gathering the informa-
tion necessary to determine essential job functions is easy and in-
expensive.1 9 An employer who wishes to have greater flexibility in
determining job duties, or whose organization fails to conform to
the model for which the regulations and case law under the ADA
and other anti-discrimination statutes were written, will find it
difficult and expensive to defend against ADA lawsuits. The very
16 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8) (1988 & Supp. V 1993); 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(m) (1995).
17 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n) (1995); see, e.g., Grenier v. Cyanamid Plastics, Inc., 70 F.3d 667,
674-75 (1st Cir. 1995); Benson v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 62 F.3d 1108, 1112-13 (8th Cir.
1995); Milton v. Scrivner, Inc., 53 F.3d 1118, 1123-24 (10th Cir. 1995).
The EEOC regulation lists criteria for this determination, including, "[the employer's
judgment as to which functions are essential." 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(3)(i). Clearly, however,
courts and government agencies reserve the right to disagree with the employer or deem
the employer's judgment as pretext for discrimination. An individual who, in the eyes of a
court or agency, "satisfies the requisite skill, experience, education and other job-related
requirements of the employment position... and who can perform the essential functions
of [the] position" is qualified for that position, thus may not be denied the position on the
basis of any incapabilities or limitations the employer might perceive as relevant. Id.
§ 1630.2(m) (1995).
Is 42 U.S.C. §§ 12112(a) (Supp. V 1993) (prohibiting discrimination against a qualified
individual with a disability because of that disability); 29 C.F.R. § 1630.4 (1995).
19 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(m) (1995). Courts and the EEOC may collect evidence of job qualifi-
cations, such as experience, skill, and educational requirements. Id. They must determine
what modifications may be made to the job or work site while retaining the "essential func-
tions" of the job. Id. § 1630.2(o). They must determine the difficulty or expense of such
modifications. Id. § 1630.2 (p). They must determine the employer's practices in hiring, pro-
motion, layoff, rates of compensation in all forms, job assignments, positions descriptions,
training, social and recreational programs, and all other terms, conditions, and privileges
of employment. Id. § 1630.4. All of these determinations and inquiries requires information
the employer is beholden, at least in practical terms, to collect and produce if it wishes to
avoid an adverse finding.
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lack of bureaucratic organization that the regulations and case
law assume may easily provide the foundation for enough doubt
regarding the employer's motivation in its decisions to allow a
plaintiff to avoid summary judgment on his claim. 2° The substan-
tial cost of trial and the greater risk of a finding of liability are
substantial penalties on an employer's choice to avoid bureaucra-
tized and standardized organization, not to mention the growth of
the employer's business.
There are other ways in which the ADA restricts freedom in a
derivative way. The ADA forbids discrimination against an indi-
vidual merely "regarded as having a disability."21 Obviously, this
greatly increases the scope of the ADA. An employer must be con-
cerned not just with known disabilities, but also with rumors, rep-
utation, or even the employer's own perceptions of an employee's
abilities. Further, the employer may not discriminate against an
employee because of the known disability of an individual with
whom that employee has a relationship or association.22 Note that
this extends to business, social, and other relationships, and is not
limited to family.23
The employer is also liable under the ADA for participating in a
contract or other arrangement or relationship that has the effect
20 Distinctions between jobs or the employees holding them, quality of employee per-
formance, and qualifications will often give rise to genuine issues of fact for trial in a dis-
crimination lawsuit. This risk is particularly high where an organization is less formal or
more flexibly ordered. Any inconsistency, lack of concrete evidence, or appearance of discre-
tion in decision-making in the employer's practices can easily preclude the relatively inex-
pensive summary judgment and force the employer to take its chances at an expensive trial
or settle for a large amount in payment to the plaintiff. See supra, note 10. Justifications of
employment decisions which do not fit the expected pattern, or which are consistent with
flexibility rather than elaborate structures, are much more likely to be found the kind of
ad-hoc, after-the-fact rationales which cannot preclude a jury trial as to whether the em-
ployer's true motivation was the forbidden criterion.
21 42 U.S.C. § 12101(2)(B) (Supp. V 1993); 29 C.F.R. § 1620.2(1) (1995) ("regarded as hav-
ing a disability" defined in terms of the employer's treatment and "attitude" toward the
employee); see also Wooten v. Farmland Foods, 58 F.3d 382, 385 (8th Cir. 1995) ("The focus
is on the impairments effect upon the attitudes of others. This provision is intended to
combat the effect of 'archaic attitudes,' erroneous perceptions, and myths that work to the
disadvantage of persons with or regarded as having disabilities.") (citations omitted);
Vande Zande v. Wisconsin Dep't of Admin., 44 F.3d 538, 541 (7th Cir. 1995) ("Many such
impairments are not in fact disabling but are believed to be so, and the people having them
may be denied employment or otherwise shunned as a consequence.").
22 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(4) (Supp. V 1993); 29 C.F.R. § 1630.8 (1995); see also Den Hartog
v. Wasatch Academy, 909 F. Supp. 1393 (1995) (discussing parameters of prohibition on
"association" discrimination).
23 29 C.F.R. § 1630.8 (1995); see also 29 C.F.R. Part 1630 app., discussion of § 1630.8
("This protection is not limited to those who have a familial relationship with an individual
with a disability."). Congress rejected a proposed amendment which would have so limited
the protection. H.R. REP. No. 485, 101st Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 2, at 62, & pt. 3, at 38 (1990).
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of subjecting disabled employees to discrimination.2 4 Thus, the
employer must take care to examine its arrangements with con-
tractors, vendors, unions, consultants, insurers, and employment
agencies.
The ADA restricts medical examination of prospective employ-
ees; such tests may only be conducted after a conditional job offer
and only if all employees are subjected to the test.25 Thus, in order
to test any employee, no matter how obviously limited in some
abilities, the employer must test all new employees, whether or
not the cost of that test justifies testing the other new employees.
Further, the test or exam must be "job-related and consistent with
business necessity."26 While employers may inquire regarding the
ability of the employee to perform job-related functions, 27 employ-
ers must be wary lest an agency or court second-guess whether
the test is overbroad or unnecessary. Employers must also be ex-
tremely careful regarding the records of such exams and tests, as
such information must be recorded on "separate forms and in sep-
arate medical files" and treated as "a confidential medical
record."
28
The ADA is the first federal anti-discrimination law to directly
restrict questions an employer may ask a prospective employee.
Under the ADA, an employer may not inquire whether an appli-
cant has a disability or regarding the disability. 29 The employer
may, however, inquire into the ability of the applicant to perform
job-related functions.3 ° Similar prohibitions govern inquiries or
examination of current employees. 3'
2A 42 U.S.C. § 12112(bX2) (1995); 29 C.F.R. § 1630.6 (1995); see also Eckles v. Consoli-
dated Rail Corp., 890 F. Supp. 1391 (S.D. Ind. 1995) (noting applicability of this provision
to collective bargaining agreements); Bruton v. Southeastern Pa. Transp. Authority, No.
CIV.A. 94-CV-3111, 1994 WL 470277, at *3 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 19, 1994) (same); Eisfelder v.
Michigan Dep't of Natural Resources, 847 F. Supp. 78, 84 (W.D. Mich Nov. 16, 1993).
25 42 U.S.C. §§ 12112(d)(2)(A), (d)(3XA) (Supp. V 1993); 29 C.F.R. § 1630.14(b) (1995);
Grenier v. Cyanimid Plastics, Inc., 70 F.3d 667, 675-78 (1st Cir. 1995).
26 42 U.S.C. § 12112(d)(4)(A) (Supp. V 1993). EEOC regulations require any criteria used
to screen out employees as a result of the examination or inquiry to be job-related and
consistent with business necessity. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.14(b)(3) (1995); see also Yin v. Califor-
nia, No. C94-20116 JW, 1994 WL 594043, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 21, 1994) (noting business
necessity showing required).
27 42 U.S.C. § 12112(d)(2)(B) (Supp. V 1993); 29 C.F.R. § 1630.14(a) (1995).
28 42 U.S.C. § 12112(d)(3)(B) (Supp. V 1993); 29 C.F.R. § 1630.14(b)(1) (1995).
29 42 U.S.C. § 12112(d)(2)(A) (Supp. V 1993); 29 C.F.R. §§ 1630.13, 1630.14 (1995).
30 42 U.S.C. § 12112(d)(2XB) (Supp V 1993); see also 29 C.F.R. 1630.14(a) (1995).
31 29 C.F.R. §§ 1630.13(b), 1630.14(c). The scope of this prohibition may be surprisingly
broad. Cf Doe v. Kohn Nast & Graf, P.C., 866 F. Supp. 190, 197 (E.D. Pa. 1994) (stating
[Vol. 10:495
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The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") en-
forcement guidance on pre-employment inquiries highlights the
intrusive scope of the ADA on this issue. The original enforce-
ment guidance barred an employer from asking any question
which was "likely to elicit information about a disability" before it
had extended a job offer.32 It set forth specific questions which
were permissible and prohibited. For example, the EEOC consid-
ered each of the following questions to be a disability-related in-
quiry, and thus an ADA violation, despite any predictive value the
answer might have for future job performance:
* Do you have a disability which would interfere with your
ability to perform this job?
* How many days were you sick last year?
* How much alcohol do you drink each week? Have you ever
been treated for alcohol problems? 33
Perhaps more exasperating was how fine the line was the EEOC
tried to draw. For instance, the question "[d]o you have 20/20 vi-
sion?" was permissible; the question "[wihat is your corrected vi-
sion?" was impermissible.3 4 "How well can you handle stress?"
was permissible; "[d]oes stress affect your ability to be produc-
tive?" was not.35
The EEOC subsequently revised its enforcement guidance,
eliminating much of the reference of the earlier guidance to partic-
ular questions.36 Nevertheless, the proscription on questions
"likely to elicit information about a disability" remains, with sim-
ply less elaboration on what that means. 7
surreptitious search of employee's office producing letter regarding disability is medical
inquiry under the ADA).
32 EEOC Enforcement Guidance: Pre-employment Disability-Related Inquiries and
Medical Examinations Under the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, issued May,
1994 [hereinafter Original Pre-employment Inquiry Guidance].
33 Original Pre-employment Inquiry Guidance, "Application of ADA Provisions."
34 Id. § IVA.
3 5 Id.
36 EEOC Revised Enforcement Guidance: Pre-employment Disability-Related Inquiries
and Medical Examinations Under the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, Oct. 10,
1995, EEOC Compliance Manual § 6903 (1995) [hereinafter Revised Pro-employment In-
quiry Guidance].
37 Revised Pre-employment Inquiry Guidance, "The Pre-Offer Stage: What is a Disabil-
ity-Related Question?"
1995]
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The ADA also polices reference-checking. According to the
EEOC, the employer may not make any inquiry of a third-party
that it may not make of the applicant. 8
The ADA requires that any qualification standards or other cri-
teria that may screen out the disabled to be job-related for that
position and consistent with business necessity. 9 It also bars the
employer from using criteria that have the effect of discrimination
on the basis of disability or perpetuate the discrimination of
others.40 Thus, the ADA forbids employment practices which have
a "disparate impact" on the disabled, even if the employer does not
intend to discriminate against disabled employees.4 1
The second way in which the ADA exceeds past incursions into
liberty is the imposition of the duty of reasonable accommodation
of a disability.42 An employer must make a reasonable accommo-
dation to the known physical or mental limitations of an otherwise
qualified individual with a disability.43 This is an affirmative obli-
gation to offer those employees with disabilities better terms and
38 Revised Pre-employment Inquiry Guidance, "May an employer ask third parties ques-
tions it could not ask the applicant directly?"
39 42 U.S.C. § 12112(bX6) (Supp. V 1993); 29 C.F.R. § 1630.10 (1995); see also McDaniel
v. Alliedsignal, Inc., 896 F. Supp. 1482, 1491 (W.D. Mo. 1995) (stating that disqualification
standards that screen out individuals with disabilities do not violate ADA so long as quali-
fications standard is "job-related and consistent with business necessity"); Ethridge v. Ala-
bama, 860 F. Supp. 808, 819-20 (N.D. Ala. 1994 (same).
40 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(3) (Supp. V 1993); 29 C.F.R. § 1630.7 (1995).
41 See, e.g., Carlson v. Inacom Corp., 885 F. Supp. 1314, 1322 (D. Neb. 1995) (finding no
evidence of disparate impact); Champ v. Baltimore County, 884 F. Supp. 991, 995 (D. Md.
1995) (holding plaintiff failed to make out case); Schmidt v. Safeway Inc., 864 F. Supp. 991,
1001 (D. Or. 1994) (allowing claim for compensatory damages without proof of intent be-
cause of availability of disparate impact theory); Peoples v. Nix, No. 93-5892, 1994 WL
423856, at *3 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 11, 1994) (noting limitation on disparate impact claims assert-
able under ADA).
42 29 U.S.C. § 793 (1988). While the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 has a similar require-
ment, the ADA's scope is much broader. Id. The Rehabilitation Act's private sector anti-
discriminatory provision applies only to federally-funded programs or activities. Id. It also
requires those performing federal contracts in excess of $10,000 to take 'affirmative action"
in favor of qualified individuals with disabilities. Id. The ADA, however, covers employers
of 15 or more employees in an industry affecting commerce. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(5)(A) (Supp.
V 1993).
Title VII requires reasonable accommodation of religious practices in employment. 42
U.S.C. § 2000e(j) (Supp. V 1993). See, e.g., Ansonia Bd. of Educ. v. Philbrook, 479 U.S. 60,
68-69 (1986); Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63, 74 (1977). However, the
ADA duty of reasonable accommodation is much broader in scope due to the vastly greater
limitations disabilities are likely to have upon the performance of job duties. Also, the "de
minimis cost" limitation upon the Title VII duty of reasonable accommodation was rejected
by Congress for application to the ADA duty of reasonable accommodation. See infra, note
52.
4 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A) (Supp. V 1993); 29 C.F.R. § 1630.9 (1995).
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conditions than those offered other employees, at greater cost to
the employer than that spent on other employees.44
The ADA provides examples of reasonable accommodations,
such as making facilities accessible, job restructuring, modified
work schedules, reassignment, new or modified equipment, new or
modified testing or training, and readers or interpreters. 45 The
EEOC also suggests that reasonable accommodation may require
permitting the use of accrued paid leave at a time the employer
would otherwise not, providing additional unpaid leave, or provid-
44 See, e.g., Lyons v. Legal Aid Soc'y, 68 F.3d 1512, 1517 (2d Cir. 1995) (noting that
employer may be obligated to provide parking convenient to workplace for disabled em-
ployee as reasonable accommodation, though does not provide it to other employees); Buck-
ingham v. United States, 998 F.2d 735, 740-41 (9th Cir. 1993) (noting that reasonable ac-
commodations must be made to allow disabled employees to enjoy privileges and benefits of
employment equal to those enjoyed by non-disabled employees); McWright v. Alexander,
982 F.2d 222, 227 (7th Cir. 1992) (noting change in standard operating procedure is "the
essence of reasonable accommodation"); Ward v. Westvaco Corp., 859 F. Supp. 608, 616 (D.
Mass. 1994) (providing employee with larger computer display screen and different lighting
than provided to other employees may be reasonable accommodation); 29 C.F.R. part 1630
app., discussion of section 1630.9 (reasonable accommodation contemplates changes in way
disabled employee, in contrast to employee's peers, does job); see also Rosalie K. Murphy,
Reasonable Accommodation and Employment Discrimination Under Title I of the Ameri-
cans with Disabilities Act, 64 S. CAL. L. REv. 1607, 1608 (1991) (stating that ADA "requires
employers to take positive steps toward including workers with disabilities").
Even the requirement of the ability to regularly and reliably appear for work is not im-
mune from alteration as a reasonable accommodation. See Teahan v. Metro-North Com-
muter R.R. Co., 951 F.2d 511, 515-17 (2d Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 815 (1992) (not-
ing that in Rehabilitation Act context, if absenteeism is due to disability, and employer
terminates employee for that absenteeism, employer has acted because of disability); Fritz
v. Mascotech Automotive Sys. Group Inc., 914 F. Supp. 1481, 1487-91 (E.D. Mich. 1996)
(stating that employer must prove that employee's attendance problems would not have
been alleviated by a reasonable accommodation in order to avoid ADA liability).
The reality of the reasonable accommodation requirement as an additional benefit to dis-
abled employees belies the EEOC's claim that reasonable accommodation is "a form of non-
discrimination." 29 C.F.R. app. part 1603, discussion of § 1630.9. The EEOC's position can
only be understood if one defines discrimination to include any accounting for differences in
ability. Indeed, the EEOC's position is positively Orwellian: discrimination (in favor of dis-
abled employees) is non-discrimination.
The employer also has the obligation to gather the information needed in order to deter-
mine what accommodation is necessary for the disabled employee to perform the job. The
employer is only then to determine the reasonableness of that accommodation. If the inter-
active process between the employer and the employee by which the reasonable accommo-
dation is to be determined breaks down, and a court determines that the break down is the
fault of the employer's lack of good faith participation, the employer is liable for failure to
reasonably accommodate the employee's disability. See Beck v. University of Wisc. Bd. of
Regents, 75 F.3d 426, 428 (7th Cir. 1996). Despite the uncertain nature of these terms,
neither good faith nor rational belief on the part of the employer is a defense to a charge of
discrimination. Mantolete v. Bolger, 767 F.2d 1416, 1423 (9th Cir. 1985).
Finally, employers may find summary judgment that they have provided a reasonable
accommodation difficult to obtain. See, e.g., Frye v. Aspin, 997 F.2d 426, 428 (8th Cir. 1993)
("The question whether an employer has provided a 'reasonable accommodation' is ordina-
rily a question of fact.").
45 42 U.S.C. § 1211(9) (Supp. V 1993); see also 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(o) (1995); 29 C.F.R.
part 1630 app., discussion of §§ 1630.2(o), 1630.9.
506 ST. JOHN'S JOURNAL OF LEGAL COMMENTARY
ing "personal assistants"-additional employees hired and paid
for by the employer so that the disabled employee can perform the
job another employee could perform alone.46
All terms and conditions of employment, including those which
aid the employee in performing the job, are a kind of price for the
employment. The effort necessary to perform a job, the arrange-
ments the employee must make in order to perform the job suc-
cessfully, and the employee's opportunity costs, are the costs to
the employee in exchange for which she receives her compensa-
tion. The employer must provide conditions sufficient to attract
employees, including higher compensation for less pleasant condi-
tions or for jobs which require greater effort or inconvenience.
Working conditions, the realm within which reasonable accommo-
dation is determined, are inseparable from the other terms of the
employment relationship. A reasonable accommodation forced on
the employer is an alteration in the bargain between the employer
and employee over the prices each will pay.47
The ADA's reasonable accommodation is, in fact, a price floor, a
dictate that the employer must pay at least a certain amount in
order to enter into the transaction, or else not enter into the trans-
action at all. Whenever government attempts to set and maintain
a "reasonable price" for a commodity, a shortage of that commod-
ity inevitably results. This is the oft-observed pattern in artifi-
cially-imposed prices created by government price controls. Both
price ceilings, such as those imposed on gasoline which produced
shortages and long lines at gas stations in the 1970s, and price
floors, such as minimum wages, hinder the market in allocating
resources as efficiently as possible. In the case of the price for em-
ployment, price floors mean fewer jobs, including fewer jobs for
disabled people.4 8
46 29 C.F.R. part 1630 app., discussion of § 1630.2(o) (1995).
47 See, e.g., Vande Zande v. Wisconsin Dep't of Admin., 44 F.3d 538, 546 (7th Cir. 1995).
The approach Chief Judge Posner took in determining reasonable accommodation consid-
ered the relationship between the cost to the employer and the benefit to the disabled em-
ployee. Even this approach, however, cannot account for the subjectivity of determining the
benefit to the disabled employee from the accommodation, or for how courts or agencies
may rationally determine the costs of accommodations such as job restructuring.
48 See, e.g., RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, FORBIDDEN GRouNDS: THE CASE AGAINST EMPLOYMENT
DISCRIMINATION LAws 491 (1992). "[Iln the effort to aid disabled persons who are able to
work, the ADA necessarily increases the costs to those disabled persons (and their families)
who are too impaired to work at all." Id.
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A price floor has a particularly devastating impact on jobs for
those who have relatively less to offer in terms of skill or exper-
tise, because such people must often rely on their ability to offer a
lower price for their labor in order to obtain a job. A government
mandated price floor, as any "reasonable price," will, at the mar-
gin, shut some of these people out of the job market. Unless an
applicant offers a profitable return on all the compensation the
employer offers her, the applicant will not be hired. This compen-
sation includes elements the employer has no choice but to offer,
such as a reasonable accommodation of a disability. Those who
can command a price for their labor well above the "reasonable"
price may profit somewhat by the elimination of price competition.
It is just as likely, however, that the total compensation to these
employees will not increase, but rather that the costs of accommo-
dation will prevent otherwise higher cash compensation or bene-
fits. The total compensation, in terms of cost to the employer, will
remain the same.
Under the ADA, the employer need not provide an accommoda-
tion which is an "undue hardship," even if it is reasonable.49 An
"undue hardship" is an action requiring significant difficulty or ex-
pense, in light of the cost, the financial resources of the employer,
the number of the employer's employees, the employer's facilities,
and the type of the employer's operation.50 The undue hardship
limitation, however, offers little reprieve from the problems
caused by the reasonable accommodation duty. First, employers
are likely to find it quite difficult to convince a court that an ac-
commodation which has been found reasonable is, nonetheless, an
undue hardship.51 In addition, courts are likely to require a rather
strong showing that the accommodation will cause insolvency or
similar financial disaster before they conclude that the hardship is
undue.52
49 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A) (Supp. V 1993); 29 C.F.R. § 1630.9 (1995).
50 42 U.S.C. § 12111(10) (Supp. V 1993); 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(p) (1995).
51 See Vande Zande, 44 F.3d at 545-46 (stating that reasonable accommodation is one
which benefits disabled employee, but not in way disproportionate to costs of accommoda-
tion to employer; the accommodation is, nonetheless, an undue hardship if, despite its rea-
sonableness for a normal employer, the cost of accommodation would financially break the
employer).
52 See 29 C.F.R. part 1630 app., discussion of § 16 3 0.2(p) (noting undue hardship refers
to accommodation which would be unduly costly, extensive, substantial, disruptive, or that
would fundamentally alter that nature or operation of business); Julie Brandfield, Note,
Undue Hardship: Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 59 FoRDHAM L. REv. 113,
123-30 (1990) (suggesting that courts should interpret undue hardship quite narrowly: "the
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Ultimately, the undue hardship limitation is another form of
price control, offering another opportunity for government to sec-
ond-guess the market on whether the benefits of a business action
justify the costs. It also offers an opportunity for further intrusion
into a business' affairs, as the information necessary to determine
undue hardship is likely to involve discovery into both the em-
ployer's finances and workplace practices. 3
Friedrich von Hayek's ideas on the importance and value of free
market prices and the impossibility of rational government deter-
mination of prices are valuable tools in analyzing the ADA duty of
reasonable accommodation.5 4 Hayek demonstrated that it is im-
possible for any single decision maker, or even a group of decision
makers, to set an efficient price, however "rationally" they attempt
to do so. 55 The market, a collection of individual actors each seek-
ing her own advantage, however, sets efficient prices quickly and
without anyone's conscious design. The market price accounts for
information, knowledge, and preferences dispersed among many
persons. Hayek showed that the idea of government deciding a
reasonable price for a commodity is a fallacy and a conceit, and
that such an effort would result in real inefficiencies, foregone
wealth and utility, and unnecessary suffering.5 6
The market for labor, including the labor of those one might
consider "disabled," is no different from any other market. The
price for that labor cannot be efficiently set by central planners, or
by anyone by fiat, but must respond to market forces.57
undue hardship exemption promises not profit maximization, but protection from material
threats to business viability."); see also Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63,
73 (1977). Note that while an accommodation which imposes more than a de minimis cost is
an "undue hardship," and thus not required under the Title VII duty to reasonably accom-
modate religious beliefs, this limitation was explicitly rejected by Congress in the ADA
reasonable accommodation/undue hardship context. S. REP. No. 101-116, 101st Cong., 1st
Sess. 36 (1989).
53 See, e.g., 29 C.F.R. part 1630 app., discussion of § 1630.2(p) (describing how financial
resources and basis of funding should be examined in order to determine undue hardship).
54 See FRIEDRICH A. VON HAYEK, INDWIIUALISM AND ECONOMIC ORDER 90-91 (1948)
[hereinafter INDIVIDUALISM]; FRIEDRICH A. VON HAYEK, THE ROAD TO SERFDOM 49-51 (1944);
see also Ludwig von Mises, Economic Calculation in the Socialist Commonwealth, in COL-
LECTrviST ECONOMIC PLANNING (Friedrich A. von Hayek ed. 1967).
55 See VON HAYEK, INDIVIDUALISM, supra note 54, at 90-91; Ludwig von Mises, supra note
54.
56 See generally VON HAYEK, INDIVIDuALISM, supra note 54.
57 See, e.g., VON HAYEK, INDIVDUALISM, supra note 54, at 90-91; Friedrich A. von Hayek,
Two Pages of Fiction: The Impossibility of Socialist Calculation, in THz ESSENCE OF HAYEK
53-61 (Chiaki Nishiyama & Kurt R. Leube ed. 1984) [hereinafter ESSENCE OF HAYEK];
Friedrich A. von Hayek, "Social" or "Distributive Justice," in ESSENCE OF HAYEK, supra, at
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Reasonable accommodation also evokes medieval notions of
"just price.""8 Like "just price," reasonable accommodation is an
ultimately futile attempt to determine objectively fair substantive
terms of exchange.
The ADA, however, does not shrink from claiming that govern-
ment possesses the omniscience necessary for such an endeavor.
Congress explicitly purported to find that individuals with disabil-
ities have been discriminated against due to "stereotypic assump-
tions not truly indicative of the individual ability of such individu-
als."5 9 Congress believed that employers practiced "unnecessary"
discrimination and prejudice which cost billions in productivity.60
Thus, the ADA is intended to extract opportunities from employ-
ers for individuals with disabilities unless they are actually un-
able to do the job, as determined ex post facto by courts or the
EEOC.6 ' Congress resolved to thwart "fears about increased costs
and decreased productivity" which would naturally arise from its
massive deprivation of liberty by requiring that "job criteria actu-
ally measure skills required by the job."62 Of course, the intrusion
and displacement necessary to determine that the criteria do so is
itself considerable.
There is no reason to believe that Congress, courts, or the EEOC
can or will make better decisions about employment than the em-
ployers and employees involved can. Experience suggests the op-
posite is true. More importantly, even if Congress and the rest of
government were staffed with the most intelligent, selfless, and
well-intentioned people possible, Hayek and history teach us that
government cannot determine a reasonable price. What govern-
ment can do is to produce gross inefficiencies, retard innovation,
and restrict opportunities. The lost opportunities, companies
which do not grow, products and services which are never offered,
and jobs which are never created because of the ADA are pre-
vented from ever coming into existence in the first place, rather
62-100; Friedrich A. von Hayek, Uses of Knowledge in Society, in ESSENCE OF HAYEK,
supra, at 211-224.
58 See, e.g., RUDOLF KAULLA, THEORY OF THE JUST PRICE: A HISTORICAL & CRrrCAL
STUDY OF THE PROBLEM OF ECONOMIC VALUE (Robert D. Hogg Trans. 1940). The medieval
"just price" theory states that goods or services have an intrinsically just, ethical, or in this
case reasonable price independent of market forces. Id.
59 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(7) (Supp. V 1993).
60 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(9) (Supp. V 1993).
61 H.R. REP. No. 485, 101st Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 3, at 31.
62 Id.
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than being destroyed after creation. Consequently, the destruc-
tive affect of the ADA is too easily underestimated.1
3
The ADA is an anti-discrimination statute different in quality
from those of the past. It directly implies government control over
the very way employers fashion jobs, set qualifications of employ-
ment, and determine the conditions of employment they will offer
to their employees. The ADA is thus a quantum leap of govern-
ment intrusion into the way people order their businesses and
their lives.
To return to Walter Williams' analogy, with which I started, the
water may not be boiling yet, but the ADA has made it a bit
warmer.
63 Cf Ron A. Vassel, Note, The Americans with Disabilities Act: The Cost, Uncertainty
and Inefficiency, 13 J.L. & COM. 397, 411 (1994) (concluding that ambiguity and burden of
ADA makes it ineffective).
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